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1                                                Abstract
             The Asian financial crisis of 1997 started as an apparently limited shaking in remote Thailand,
             but then amplified into a crisis whose impact affected whole stock markets in the world.
             Building upon the theoretical framework of recent research, this paper empirically estimated
             dynamic capital mobility of seven Asian countries using the deviations from uncovered interest
             parity.  It is shown that six countries’ capital mobility increased in the 1990s.
             Also, Capital market risk of Asian countries are estimated using a GARCH model and it is
             found that capital market risk of Thailand has increased with the most volatility.  Causality   test
             results might serve as an evidence of contagion of Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia since those
             countries have experienced little increase in capital market risk before the 1997.
             Finally, using the concept of interest parity forward rate, seven Asian countries’ exchange rate
             misalignment relative to the Japanese yen are estimated and it is shown that before the crisis all
             Asian countries’ currencies were overvalued about 30 to 40 percent against the Japanese yen.
             Policy implication of this finding is that Asian countries can remove this overvaluation by
             increasing the weight of Japanese yen in a multiple basket or by revising their exchange rate
             system such that their yen exchange rate reflect the relative fundamentals of two countries.
2I. Introduction
          The Asian financial crisis of 1997 started as an apparently limited shaking in remote
Thailand, but then amplified into a crisis  whose impact was felt in stock markets on every
continent.  Both international institutions and national governments joined in the policy
response (Obstfeld, 1998).  The sources of  these large repercussions may include
increased capital mobility, capital market risk and volatility of exchange rates.
       This paper investigates the dynamic capital mobility, time-varying capital market risk
and exchange rate misalignment of seven Asian countries  with special reference to Japan,
in an attempt to find the causes and policy implications of financial crisis in east Asia.
         The question of international capital mobility and financial crisis has attracted much
recent attention from both researchers and policymakers.  A high degree of capital
mobility not only affects the independence of domestic monetary and fiscal policies, it also
increases the intricacy of managing a county’s saving and investment problems.  The issue
is of particular interest to Asia-Pacific countries, many of whom embarked upon large
scale financial market liberalization in the early 1980s.  In Japan and Korea, as well as
ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, the removal of various capital and
exchange controls coincided with a higher degree of capital mobility, overborrowing,
increased capital market risk and financial crises.  A study of dynamic capital mobility can
serve many useful purposes.  First, even in the absence of capital and exchange rate
controls, there are periods when capital flows are more smooth than others.  Second, from
3a policy perspective,  it is rewarding to know whether capital markets have indeed become
more closely linked across other countries.  Increased capital mobility not only reflects the
influence of various liberalization measures taken in each country, but also provides
obvious suggestions about management of the exchange rate.  The tremendous problems
faced with Asian crisis countries point to the policy dilemma in financially open
economies.
     More specifically, this paper deals with issues of capital mobility between seven Asian
countries and Japan by  estimating the dynamic capital mobility of those countries using
the deviation from uncovered interest parity. Second, we estimate capital market risk or
volatility using a GARCH model of conditional heteroscedasticity.  Finally, we investigate
the misalignment of Asian countries’ exchange rate vis-a-vis the Japanese yen using the
concept of interest parity forward  ratedefined in chapter II.
      This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the dynamic capital mobility of
seven Asian countries.  Section III estimates the time-varying capital market risk of these
countries using a GARCH model.  Section IV investigates the misalignment of Asian
countries’ exchange rate vis-a-vis the Japanese yen and section V concludes.
II.  Dynamic Capital Mobility in Seven Asian Countries
      Recently, some estimates of dynamic capital mobility are reported in the literature for
developed economies using simple interest rate differential or the deviation from
uncovered interest parity.  However, little effort has been made to estimate dynamic
capital mobility for emerging economies with the exception of Faruqee  (1991). This paper
4estimate the dynamic capital mobility of seven Asian countries by estimating  the
deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) and using Japanese LIBOR as a
benchmark interest rate.  Table 1 and 2 show that Asian countries’ economic dependence
on Japan is larger than on the U.S. in terms of trade volumes and long-term capital flows.
For the trade volumes (addition of export and import),  four countries’ trade volume in
with Japan is much larger than U.S for the 1990-1996.
      Table 2 compares currency composition of long-term debt of four Asian countries
with five Latin American countries.  With the exception of Malaysia in 1991 and 1995,
during the period of 1991-1995,  the remaining  Asian countries depended on Japan  as a
long-term capital supplier  more than the U.S., while the U.S. played dominant role  in
supplying capital to  Latin American countries.
1.  Economic Interdependence of Pacific Asian countries with Japan
      It has been extensively studied whether Pacific Asia’s development has increased
regional economic interdependence through trade flows (Frankel 1992; Frankel and Wei
1994) and capital flows (Kohsaka 1996).  Koshaka (1996) investigated the role of Japan
as a major capital supplier as well as a financial intermediary in Pacific Asia and he
estimated that Japan’s total long-term capital outflow reached its peak of $192 billion in
1989.   Table  3 compares the contemporaneous correlation of market interest rates
between seven Asian countries and the U.S. and Japan for the 1990s.  Correlation
coefficients for Japan are larger than those for the of U.S both in levels and first
5differences, except Singapore.  This suggests that six Asian countries have more
integrated capital market with Japan.
      Table 4 shows Granger-causality tests of Asian countries’ market interest rate (IFS
line 60c) with Japan LIBOR and U.S.  commercial paper rate (IFS line 60bc).  With
Japanese LIBOR, three sets of countries are bi-directionally Granger causing (Japan and
Korea, Singapore and Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia) and Japan is Granger causing
Korea’s interest rate unidirectionally.  While with  U.S.CP rate, two sets of countries
(Indonesia and Malaysia , Indonesia and Thailand) are mutually Granger causing for their
interest rates and U.S. is Granger causing Thailand.  For both cases, one salient common
feature is that Indonesia and Malaysia is mutually Granger causing each other implying
close financial interdependence of two countries.  However, there is little evidence that
interest rates of  Asian countries are highly integrated differently from advanced countries.
 2. Interest Parity and International Capital Mobility
       Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argued that, building on a close link between domestic
saving and investment, international capital might not as mobile as is often assumed.  Since
then , that line of research has evolved into two directions.  One uses the Feldstein-
Horioka criterion, investigating the link between domestic savings and investment (Cumby
1987: Krol 1996), and the other investigates the parity between domestic and foreign
interest rates (Kuen and Song, 1996).  To equate a zero correlation between domestic
saving and investment with perfect capital mobility, a number of conditions must hold.
Not only must the real interest parity be satisfied but also investment behavior need to
6respond in a particular way to interest changes but these two requirements can not be
easily met ( Frankel 1991; Obstfeld 1994).
     Also, it is obvious that heavily indebted small countries will not be able to go on raising
international indebtedness indefinitely at a fixed interest rate, not even in the lender’s
currency.  The reason is that country risk will rise as pressures mount to return to a
sustainable path of borrowing. (Furstenberg, 1998).
     Regarding tests for interest rate parity, opinions differ on the proper measure to be
used.  Of the two commonly used parity concepts, covered interest parity (CIP) is often
believed to be a better measure of financial openness than uncovered interest parity (UIP).
Deviations from CIP indicate that there are some risk-free arbitrage opportunities that
might have arisen from capital and exchange controls, differential tax treatments for
capital returns in different countries, the possibility of future controls and regulations, and
other country-specific transaction costs such as differences in language and business
practices.   These are generally considered barriers to capital movement in a generic sense
(Kuen and Song, 1996).
      However,  while the relevance of UIP as a measure of capital mobility is limited in
static analysis, it may provide more telling indications a dynamic setting.  Here, changes in
the extent of deviation from UIP do provide some information about changing capital
mobility.  As capital markets become more integrated, one possible consequence is that
assets denominated in different currencies become more substitutable.  This will decrease
the risk-premium and reduce the uncovered interest differential.  In other words, an
7increased tightening of uncovered interest differentials over time could be  associated with
an increased level of capital mobility.
      Faruquee (1992) applied this argument in his study of dynamic capital mobility in four
Asian economies.  He investigated the differential between the LIBOR rate on yen
deposits and domestic interest rates  and fitted a ARCH structure to these differentials.
The size of the differential bands in these countries was used to illustrate the dynamic
changes of capital mobility in these countries.  A smaller band is said to reflect more
financial openness.
3. The Model.
     I start from covered interest parity (CIP) hypothesis, which follows the assumption of
arbitrage between spot and forward foreign exchange markets.  If the conditions for risk-
free arbitrage exist, the ratio of the forward to the spot exchange rate will equal to the
interest differential between assets.  CIP can be expressed in following way:
  (1)              Ft,t+1 / S t  =  It,,1  / I* t,,1
where S t      is the price of foreign currency in units of domestic currency at time t, Ft,t+1 is
the forward value of  S for a contract expiring 1 period in the future, It,,1  is one period
ahead interest rate on domestic bond, and I* t,,1  is  the corresponding interest rate on the
foreign bond.  Taking the logarithm of equation (1) yields equation (2).
    (2)              ft,t+1 -  st  =  it,,1    - i* t,,1
8where logarithms are denoted by lower-case letters.
Equation (2) is a risk-free arbitrage condition that holds independently from the
investor’s preferences.   However, if investors are risk averse, the forward rate can
differ from the expected future spot rate  by a premium that compensates them for the
perceived riskiness of holding domestic versus foreign assets.
(3)            D se t ,t+1 = ( it,, 1  - i* t,,1 )  -  r t,,t+1
When risk premium (r t,,t+1) is zero, equation (3) defines UIP, i.e., the change in the
expected exchange rate (D se t ,t+1 ) equals the current interest differential.   Equation (3)  is
generally tested jointly with the hypothesis of rational expectations in foreign exchange
markets.  In this case,  future realization of  S will equal its expected value at time t plus a
white-noise error term that is uncorrelated with all information known at time t.
(4)      s t+1  =   sr t ,t+1      + e t ,t+1
where, sr t ,t+1 is  the rational expectation of the exchange rate at time t+1 formed in time t.
Plugging equation (4) into equation (3) yields equation (5).
(5)  D s t ,t+1 =  ( it,,1    - i* t,,1 )  -  r t,,t+1      + e t ,t+1
where the left side of equation (5) is the realized change in the exchange rate from t to
t+1.   The joint hypothesis of UIP and rational expectations is tested via the following
regression equation:
(6)  D  s t ,t+1  =  a  +  b ( it,,1   - i* t,1 ) + h t ,t+1
9Under the assumption that the composite error term, h t ,t+1  , which consists of  both
risk premia and expectational errors, is orthogonal to the interest differential, the
estimated slope parameter in equation (6) should be unity which is generally referred
to as the “unbiasedness hypothesis” in tests of UIP (Meredith and Chinn, 1998).
        To operationalize the model,  the uncovered interest parity (UIP) and ex ante
PPP conditions are modeled in following way (Moosa 1997: Bhati and Moosa 1994,
1995).  The UIP hypothesis postulates that  in the presence of perfect capital mobility
with no capital controls, transaction costs or risk premia, the expected rate of change
of the spot exchange rate will equal to the nominal interest differential on perfectly
comparable  financial assets denominated in different currencies across countries.  This
condition is given by
( 7)         ( 1 + I t) = ( 1 + D Se t ) ( 1 + I* t ),
where D Se t is the expected rate of change of the spot exchange rate.    The alternative
specification is derived by solving equation (7) for the expected spot exchange rate Se
to obtain
 (8)   Se =  F*  ,
where  F*= S[(1+I)/(1+I*)] is the interest parity forward rate which is equal to the
forward exchange rate, F, if and only if the CIP holds.  Taking logarithms in equation
(8),  we obtain equation (9)
  (9)  se t+1  =  f*t ,
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where se t  is  the logarithm of the expected spot rate and f*t is the logarithm of the
interest parity forward rate.  By allowing for the behavior of  the risk premium and
incorporating the rational expectations hypothesis the model can be written in a
testable form as
(10)   s t+1  =  b 0 + b 1 f*t   + w t+1
where w t+1  is an error term reflecting the impact of news, and b 0 is  a constant term
reflecting the value of risk premium  as well as other factors such as transaction cost.
The UIP holds in strong form if  b 0 =0 and  b 1=1 are not rejected.   Assuming that this
condition holds, equation (10) becomes
 (11)  s t+1  =  f*t   + w t+1
However, when capital is not perfectly mobile because of the capital and foreign exchange
control, UIP will not hold as in the case of Pacific Asian developing countries.   The
deviation from UIP (DUIP) can be written as
(12)    DUIP t = s t+1  - f*t   + x t+1
where, DUIPt  is  a deviation from UIP and this value will vary over time and it can be
used as a measure of dynamic capital mobility.   The larger is the deviation from UIP the
higher is capital or foreign exchange control in that country, and the lower is capital
mobility.  The assumption of UIP adds an element of dynamics to the CIP condition by
hypothesizing a relationship between the observed values of variables at time t and the
value of the spot exchange rate that market participants expect at time t to prevail at time
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t+1.  As such, UIP has been embedded in many multi-period and continuous time models
of open economies.
4. Estimation of Dynamic Capital Mobility
A. Data
     For the seven Asian countries, dynamic capital mobility has been estimated with
reference to Japan using  the London inter-bank offer rate (LIBOR) on 3 month Japanese
deposits (IFS line 60ea).  For six of the Asian countries, market interest rates ( IFS line
60b) are used,  while the treasury bill rate (IFS line 60c) is used for the Philippine due to
data avaiability.  To get the nominal Japanese yen exchange rate for the other seven Asian
countries, their U.S. dollar exchange rates (IFS line ae) are converted using the U.S. dollar
exchange rate of Japanese yen (IFS line 158..ae).  In light of the large liberalization
process and possible consequent structural changes in financial structure in each country
during the 1980s, monthly data from 1990 January to March 1998 are used for the
estimation and all data are extracted August 1998 issue of IMF’s IFS CD-Rom.
B. Test of Unit Roots
     Before estimation, we tested the stationarity or non-stationarity of each time series
using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Test results are reported in Table 5.   From Table 5,
we find that, for most of time series, based on ADFt  and z statistics, we can not reject
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the null hypothesis that each series has a unit root. The exceptions are market interest
rates and exchange rates for Hong Kong.   In other words, all other time series are non-
stationary.  However, for the test of second unit roots, we can reject the null hypothesis
that first difference of each time series has a unit root with the exception of the deviation
from UIP (ADFt) for Indonesia and the nominal exchange rate of Indonesia (ADFt  and
ADFz ).
C. Estimation
     First of all, models for seven countries are identified based on various statistics
including  the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz baysian criterion for the
estimation of capital mobility (DUIPt).
       Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the identification of an ARIMA model.
Third column shows the identified ARIMA(p,i,q) process where i denotes the degrees of
integration. The fourth column show the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the
Schwarz Baysian criterion (SBC) for the model selection.  The  fifth column shows the
probability of significance of the Ljung-Box Q statistic which is uded to test a group of
autocorrelations.  The estimation results show that there is no autocorrelation in the
systems.  The last column of table 6 displays the existence of GARCH error test using the
Lagrangian Multiplier test for each model and we can conclude that each country have
GARCH error structure [for Hong Kong ARCH(1) error structure is identified].
        Models are estimated using the Box-Jenkins procedure and the estimation results are
reported in Table 7.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and we can see from the
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table 7 that most of the estimated coefficients are highly significant and all diagnostic
statistics are reasonable.
    Finally, the estimated dynamic capital mobility of seven Asian countries are presented in
Figure 1.  Except Korea, all six Asian countries’ dynamic capital mobility increased in
1990s, although with different volatilities.  The one exception, the estimates of decreasing
capital mobility of Korea with Japan ( increasing DUIP until 1995) by the end of 1995 can
be explained by the relative importance of U.S. economy with of Korea1.  If we c mpare
the trade volume of Korea with Japan and the U.S., we can find that Korea has a larger
trade volume with the U.S. than Japan and increased deviation from UIP during the crisis
period was attributable to high interest differentials with Japan (Indonesia shows the same
tendency during the crisis). The capital mobility of Hong Kong has dramatically increased
during early 1990’s and changed little for the next couple of years.  However, with
financial crisis in 1997, capital mobility decreased (deviation from UIP increased)
substantially because of the increased interest rate differentials with Japan (see Figure 4).
The dynamic capital mobility of Indonesia increased slowly up to the financial crisis.  With
the crisis, Indonesia’s capital mobility (deviation from UIP increased) decreased
substantially owing to the large interest differential with Japan.  The dynamic capital
mobility of Philippines increased through out the 1990s with some volatility.
                                         
1       The share of Japanese yen receipts and payments in current transactions of Korea to total foreign
receipts and payments decreased to 10.8% in 1995, compared to the 11.3 % in 1992.  However, that
of U.S has increased from 81.4% in 1992 to 82.1% in 1995.  The absolute share of U.S. dollar is also
significantly larger than Japanese yen for Korea during the early 1990s.
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     From Figure 1, we can see that capital mobility  increased steadily.  Also, this was true
even during the crisis period of 1997 and early 1998.  Dynamic capital mobility in
Malaysia increased during the 1990s at a relatively steady rate out of seven Asian
countries although there was a marginal decrease after the 1997 crisis.  For Singapore,
capital mobility increased throughout the period which is consistent with the findings of
Kuen and Song (1997).   For Thailand, capital mobility also increased throughout the
1990s steadily with the most volatility.
     In this section, we examined dynamic changes in the degree of international capital
mobility for the  seven Asian countries with Japan.  Our concern was not so much with
financial openness of Asian countries, but with the changes over time. For most of the
countries, deviations from uncovered interest parity declined over the 1990s, implying that
capital was indeed become increasingly mobile.
       The most significant increase in capital mobility was identified for Thailand and the
Philippines, and the financial crisis started in Thailand in 1997.  The increased capital
mobility in Asian emerging economies suggests that central banks’ ability to conduct
independent domestic monetary operations will be severely hampered.  Table 8 shows
multiple Granger causality tests of dynamic capital mobility in Asian countries. From Table
8, we can see that capital mobility of Asian countries are most significantly affected by
Singapore.  
III. Capital Market Risk in Seven Asian Countries
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     For capital mobility to be useful, it must contribute to welfare  consequences.  In this
section, we connect the concept of  dynamic capital mobility with capital market risk  as
measured by conditional heteroscedasticity.  Conditional heteroscedasticity has been used
as a measurement of risk in various studies [Domowitz and Hakkio, 1985: Hassapis, 1995:
Malliaropulos: 1997].   Both country and currency risk are often defined relative to an
international reference country or currency,  with the differential country risk of the others
allowed to include actuarial compensation for losses expected from political instability,
payments delays, and partial expropriation or default  (Furstenberg, 1988).
      This section specifies and estimates a model of time-varying systematic risk in
deviations from uncovered interest parity in international capital market.  Following
Bollerslev (1990) and Bailie and Bollerslev (1990), a particular parameterization of the
multivariate GARCH process is employed to model the conditional variance of covariance
matrix of unforecastable components of deviations from UIP.  The empirical results
indicate substantial conditional systemic risk for all Asian countries and this time-varying
risk can be explained by both fluctuations in interest rate differentials and interest parity
forward rates.
1. GARCH  Model
     Next, we turn to the model determining the conditional second moments of innovations
to UIP.  A considerable amount of empirical evidence suggests that deviations from UIP
are characterized by ARCH effects [Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984: Domowitz and Hakkio,
1985: Diebold and Pauly, 1988].  Since we did not specify a full equilibrium model of the
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economy, it is impossible to relate the conditional covariance matrix to those innovations
to a set of structural variables.  Thus, the linear GARCH model is a good candidate for
modeling the time-dependence of conditional second moments.  In order to ensure
positive definiteness, the parameterization of the multivariate GARCH model proposed by
Bollerslev (1990) and Bailie and Bollerslev (1990) is adopted.   Bringing equation (12),
GARCH (1,1) can be specified in following way.
 (12)    DUIP t = s t+1  - f*t   + x t+1
(13)      x t ~ N (0, ht )
      (14)      ht  =   f1 + f 2 e2 t-1   + h t-1
where ht is the conditional second moment.
2.  Maximum Likelihood Estimation
      Using Lagrangian multiflier (LM) test, we test for the existence of a GARCH or an
ARCH error structure is tested.  Results appear in the last column of table 6. shows the
test statistics.  The LM test statistic has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of restrictions.  We find that, except Hong Kong which has an
ARCH(1) error structure, the six countries have GARCH error structures.   Note hat the
order of the GARCH is based on well established  selection criteria, such as the Akaike or
Schwarz information criteria, which suggest that a  GARCH (1,1) variance is sufficient to
capture the dynamics of the conditional variance.  This also means that there is no need to
employ a higher order GARCH model since the simple GARCH (1,1) seems to be an
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adequate representation of the stochastic process that gives rise to the observed data.
Maximum Likelihood estimation of the GARCH model is reported in table 9.
       For the maximum likelihood estimation, the BFGS (Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfeld and
Shanno) method is used. Table 9 shows that except some constants, most of the estimated
coefficients are highly significant.
3. Capital Market Risk of Seven Asian Countries
       Using the GARCH model estimates, the conditional heteroscedasticity of deviations
from UIP of seven Asian countries are displayed in Figure 2.  We can see that the
estimated time-varying conditional heteroscedasticity captures capital market risk for the
seven Asian countries quite well, especially during the recent financial crisis period.  Table
2 shows that conditional heteroscedasticity of all seven Asian countries jumps to extremely
high levels reflecting increased capital market risk and capital outflow in those countries.
Hence, figure 2 shows the successful estimation of capital market risks in  seven Asian
countries, especially for the recent financial crisis in this area.
     Capital market risk measured by conditional heteroscedasticity is highest in Indonesia.
Hong Kong shows the lowest capital market risk during the period.  Before the financial
crisis of 1997,  we can not find signs of a substantial increase in capital market risk in
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea.  However, both the Philippines and Thailand
have displayed increasing capital market risk before the crisis .
    A sudden increase in capital market risk in 1997 with little volatility during the previous
period can be found in Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia.  This indicates that these countries
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may be affected by Thailand’s capital market risk and it is confirmed by multiple Granger
causality test in Table 10.  This test results may serve as an evidence of contagion.  Table
10 shows the probability of significance of multiple Granger causality test of capital
market risk among seven Asian countries.
     Those tests confirm that Asian financial crisis started in Thailand since no other Asian
countries Granger caused movements in the capital market risk of Thailand.  While capital
market risk in Thailand Granger-caused movements in Korea and Indonesia.
IV. Exchange Rates Misalignments of Asian Countries with Japanese yen
     Using the concept of interest parity forward rate defined in Chapter II, we estimated
nominal exchange rate misalignments of seven Asian countries against the Japanese yen.
First of all, the exchange rate systems of Asian seven countries before the crisis are
explained.  Second,  the exchange rates behavior of  the seven Asian countries’ currencies
against the yen and the dollar are discussed.  Finally, misalignments of the nominal
exchange rate with the yen are investigated.
1. Exchange Rate System of Seven Asian Countries before the Crisis
    The Philippines accepted Article VIII of the IMF on September 1995,  and  Philippine
Peso exchange rates are now determined on the basis of demand and supply in foreign
exchange market (IMF, 1997).  However, Banco Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) intervenes
when necessary to limit sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate and to maintain orderly
conditions in the market. Commercial banks trade in foreign exchange  through the
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Philippine Dealing System (PDS), an electronic screen based network.   The exchange rate
of the Peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar at the beginning of the day is the weighted average of
all transactions in the PSD during the preceding day.
      The Hong Kong dollar is linked to the U.S. dollar, the intervention currency, at the
rate of HK$ 7.80 per US$ 1.  Under this linked exchange rate arrangement, the 3 note-
issuing   banks must deliver to the Exchange Fund an amount in US dollars that is
equivalent to the local currency issued at the linked local exchange rate as backing for
their Hong Kong dollar note issues.   The Exchange Fund, in turn, issues to each note-
issuing  bank non-interest bearing  certificates of indebtedness denominated in Hong Kong
dollars.  The exchange rate of the Hong Kong  dollar is set in the exchange market at
freely negotiated rates for transactions except those that are conducted for non-issuing
purposes between the Exchange Fund and the note-issuing banks.  No exchange control
requirements are imposed on capital receipts or payments by residents or nonresidents.
       Indonesia accepted Article VIII of the IMF in 1988  and its exchange rate is
determined by Bank Indonesia (BI)  under a system of managed float, under which the
bank announces a daily “conversion rate band” (for official transactions with foreign
exchange banks, government, as well as with supranational institutions), and an
“intervention band” consisting of buying and selling rates that are computed on the basis
of a basket of currencies.  The conversion rates are set so that the buying and selling rates
are  within 2% of the previous day’s closing spot market rate.  The spread of the
intervention band was increased on June 13, 1996, to Rp 118 (5%) from Rp 192
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(approximately 8%) on September 10, 1996.  The U.S. dollar is the intervention currency
(IMF, 1997).
       The exchange rate of Korean won against the U.S. dollar is determined on the basis
of a weighted average of interbank rates for the won-dollar spot transactions of the
previous day.  During each business day, the won rate against the dollar in the interbank
market is allowed to fluctuate within margins of +(-) 2.25% against the market average
rate of the previous day (Bank of Korea, 1995).
       The price of Malaysian ringgit is determined by supply and demand.  The Bank of
Negara Malaysia (BNM) intervenes only to maintain orderly market conditions and to
avoid excessive fluctuations in the value of ringgit.  The BNM also monitors the exchange
rate against a weighted basket of currencies of Malaysia’s major trading partners and the
currencies of settlement.  The commercial banks are free  to determine and quote
exchange rates, whether spot or forward, to all customers for all currencies other than
those of Israel and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro).
        The exchange rate of Singapore dollar is determined freely in the foreign exchange
market.  However, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) monitors the external
value of the Singapore dollar against a trade weighted basket of currencies.  There are no
controls on capital and money market instruments, derivatives and other instruments, and
direct investment for capital transactions.
        The external value of the Thailand baht is determined on the basis of an undisclosed,
weighted basket of currencies of Thailand’s major trading partners.  For capital
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transactions, the sale or issue of securities is under the jurisdiction of the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC).  Under the securities law, the same rules and regulations
apply to both capital market securities (those with maturities over i years) and short-term
money market securities ( those debt securities with maturities of not more than one year).
Foreign issuers must comply with the same rules and regulations as local issuers.  Under
those regulations, any companies wishing to issue  securities to the public need to be
approved by the SEC and file the disclosure documents with the SEC for public access
(IMF, 1997).
2. Exchange Rates Movements in Asian Countries against Japanese yen and U.S. dollar
     Asian countries’ exchange rate movements against the Japanese yen and U.S. dollar are
analyzed using a multivariate Granger causality test; their significance is reported in Table
11.   First of all, an optimal lag length is chosen using a likelihood-ratio test.  For the
Japanese yen, a lag length of 8 is chosen since lag length of 7 is a restriction on lag length
8, i.e., the significance probability of chi-squared test statistic with 49 degrees of freedom
is 0.0065.  For U.S. dollar, optimal lag length of 9 is using the same tset.
       When Japanese yen exchange rates are concerned, there is more significant co-
movement of exchange rates among seven Asian countries (24 significant Granger
causalities out of 42 cases) than U.S. dollar rates (18 significant Granger causalities).
Also, we can see that there are seven pairs of countries that have bi-directional causality
for the Japanese yen exchange rates (Malaysia and Korea, Thailand and Korea, Hong
Kong and Korea, Philippines and Hong Kong, Philippines and Singapore, Hong Kong and
Malaysia, and Hong Kong and Philippines).  Also, Hong Kong is Granger causing five
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Asian countries with the only exception of Singapore implying that the exchange rate
movements of Hong Kong dollar against the Japanese yen have the most impact on the
movements of other Asian countries Japanese yen exchange rates.
       With U.S. dollar exchange rates, four pairs of countries have bi-directional Granger
causality.   However, Indonesia and Thailand show more  close Granger causality among
seven Asian countries when U.S. dollar rate is used likely due to a heavy weight on the
U.S. dollar ion Thailand’s currency basket and the fact that the dollar is the Indonesian
intervention currency.
3. Misalignments of Exchange Rates for Seven Asian Countries against Japanese yen.
     Nominal exchange rate misalignments are estimated using the concept of  interest
parity forward rate for seven Asian countries with the Japanese yen.  Nominal Japanese
yen exchange rates and interest parity forward rates for seven countries are shown in
Figure 3.  Except Singapore, the other six Asian countries experienced overvaluation of
their currency against  Japanese yen in the later sample period ( i.e., Indonesia from July
1994,  Hong Kong and Malaysia from July 1995, Thailand from January 1995,  and
Korea from July 1992). Singapore actually recorded an undervaluation in the 1990s
relative to Japanese yen.  In the early 1990s, Asian countries exchange rates relative to
Japanese yen  were undervalued.  However, as timewent on, the magnitude of  the
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undervaluation decreased eventually yielding to overvaluation.  Furthermore, the
magnitude of the overvaluation of the six Asian countries increased substantially and
resulted in  a loss of international competitiveness and a huge  trade deficit with Japan.
       The overvaluation of exchange rate was smallest for Hong Kong (maximum of 35%
in October 1997) and highest for Thailand (maximum of 54% in August 1997).  On the
average, the overvaluations (based on interest parity forward rates) ranged about 30 to 40
percent during the later sample period.
      One possible important reason for the Asian countries’ currency overvaluations
relative to the yen may be caused by the high interest rate differentials with Japan.  Figure
4 shows the market interest differentials of seven Asian countries with Japan Libor and
U.S. CP rate.  By the end of 1993, interest differentials with the U.S. were higher than
those with Japan.  However, beginning in 1994, interest differentials with Japan were
much larger than with the U.S.,  and that disparity increased up to the crisis.    In other
words,  Asian countries increasing interest differentials with Japan Libor might contributed
for the overvaluation of  six Asian countries currencies against Japanese yen and this
might resulted in the increasing current account deficit.
V. Concluding Remarks
        Recent instability in world financial markets has prompted much research in the
areas of capital mobility, capital market risk and exchange rate misalignment.  We find that
capital mobility measured by deviations from uncovered interest parity have been
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decreasing significantly for seven Asian countries with different volatility implying
incresaed capital mobility in this area.
     We also examined the capital market risk of seven Asian countries using GARCH
estimation. For Indonesia, Hong Kong, Korea and Malaysia, capital market risk did not
show significant volatility before the financial crisis.  However, the capital market risk of
Thailand had been increasing rapidly since early 1995 and of the Philippines since 1992.
     Finally, this paper studied the exchange rate misalignments of Asian countries against
Japanese yen using the concept of interest parity forward rates.  E timation results
showed that, except for Singapore,  Asian countries’ yen exchange rate were overvalued
due, partly, to the large interest differential with Japan.
     The policy implications of this study are straightforward for the exchange rate system.
Asian countries’ exchange rate determination systems are biased toward the overvaluation
of domestic currencies relative to Japanese yen. These misalignments could be removed by
(i) increasing weight of the Japanese  yen in a multiple basket or (ii) revising their
exchange rate system such that their yen exchange rates reflect the relative economic
fundamentals of the two countries including, for example, productivity, terms of trade,
net foreign assets, etc.
     As financial market integration increases, the issues of capital mobility, capital market
risk and exchange rate misalignment may cause more serious and comprehensive problem
in the world economy.
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Table 1.  Trade Volume of Asian Countries with Japan and U.S.
                                                                                                        Unit: Billion US dollars
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Indonesia Export Japan 10.9 10.8 10.8 11.2 11.5 12.4 12.9
U.S. 3.4 3.5 4.4 5.2 6.2 6.5 6.8
Import Japan 5.5 6.3 6.0 6.3 8.3 8.9 8.5
U.S. 2.5 3.4 3.8 3.3 3.4 4.6 5.1
Korea Export Japan 12.6 12.4 11.6 11.6 13.5 17.1 16.0
U.S. 19.5 18.6 18.1 18.1 20.6 24.2 21.8
Import Japan 18.6 21.1 19.5 20.0 25.4 32.6 31.4
U.S. 16.9 18.9 18.3 17.9 21.6 30.4 33.3
Malaysia Export Japan 4.5 5.5 5.4 6.1 7.0 9.2 10.4
U.S. 4.9 5.8 7.6 9.6 12.4 15.3 14.3
Import Japan 7.1 9.6 10.4 12.5 15.9 21.2 19.2
U.S. 4.9 5.6 6.3 7.7 9.9 12.7 12.1
Philippines Export Japan 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.7 3.7
U.S. 3.1 3.2 3.8 4.3 5.2 6.2 7.0
Import Japan 2.4 2.5 3.1 4.0 5.5 6.3 7.0
U.S. 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 4.2 5.2 6.2
Thailand Export Japan 3.9 5.1 5.7 6.3 7.7 9.5 9.4
U.S. 5.2 6.1 7.3 8.0 9.5 10.1 10.0
Import Japan 10.1 11.0 11.9 14.0 16.4 21.6 20.5
U.S. 3.6 4.0 4.8 5.4 6.5 8.5 9.2
Total Trade Japan 77.2 83.3 86.0 93.7 112.9 138.5 138.8
U.S. 66.5 71.7 77.1 83.1 99.4 123.6 125.8
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Source: IMF, Direction of  Trade, various issues.
  
Table 2. Currency Composition of  Long-term Debt for Selected Countries
                                                                                                Unit: Percent
_______________________________________________________________________
ASIA 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Indonesia Japanese yen 35.7 36.4 37.6 38.0 35.4
US $ 19.4 19.9 19.9 20.0 20.0
Malaysia Japanese yen 33.2 35.4 38.2 41.4 31.7
US $ 38.9 29.3 30.9 31.0 45.1
Philippines Japanese yen 34.3 34.7 38.3 38.7 36.9
US $ 32.9 33.9 30.4 30.3 31.5
Thailand Japanese yen 45.6 47.2 50.1 49.7 48.1
US $ 19.1 22.9 22.4 25.9 26.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latin America
Brazil Japanese yen 7.5 6.1 6.4 5.0 6.9
US $ 59.3 61.8 63.1 68.7 67.5
Chile Japanese yen 8.5 8.2 8.4 8.8 9.5
US $ 37.9 37.7 34.9 34.9 42.3
Colombia Japanese yen 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.3 6.1
US $ 44.2 44.6 46.6 52.4 49.9
Mexico Japanese yen 7.2 8.2 8.8 9.1 6.7
US $ 61.8 59.2 60.6 60.4 66.8
Venezuela Japanese yen 2.0 2.8 2.6 4.0 4.2
US $ 76.2 75.6 75.1 72.1 68.5
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: The World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1997
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Table 3. Contemporaneous Correlation  Matrix of  Interest Rates
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Japan
(1). LEVELS,1990:1-1998:03(Japan LIBOR)
RIND RKOR RMAL RTPP RSNG RTHL RHK RLBJAP
RIND 1
RKOR .497 1
RMAL .526 .500 1
RTPP .369 .408 .300 1
RSNG .612 .743 .544 .369 1
RTHL .760 .495 .602 .321 .575 1
RHK .343 .048 .182 .205 .019 .398 1
RLBJAP -.187 .196 -.245 .608 .027 -.186 .153 1
(2). FIRST DIFFERENCE, 1990:01-1998:03 (Japan LIBOR)
RIND 1
RKOR .119 1
RMAL -.419 .373 1
RTPP .232 .171 .246 1
RSNG -.154 .454 .462 .188 1
RTHL -.199 -.039 .146 .143 -.074 1
RHK .345 .149 -.137 .124 .030 -.035 1
RLBJAP -.085 .359 .244 -.016 .484 .137 -.063 1
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
U.S.
 (1). LEVELS,1990:1-1998:03 (CP rate)
RIND RKOR RMAL RTPP RSNG RTHL RHK RUS
RIND 1
RKOR .497 1
RMAL .526 .500 1
RTPP .369 .408 .300 1
RSNG .612 .743 .544 .369 1
RTHL .760 .495 .602 .321 .575 1
RHK .343 .048 .182 .205 .019 .398 1
RUS .315 .155 .242 -.049 .057 .044 .077 1
(2). FIRST DIFFERENCE, 1990:01-1998:03
RIND 1
RKOR .119 1
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RMAL -.419 .373 1
RTPP .232 .171 .246 1
RSNG -.154 .454 .462 .188 1
RTHL -.199 -.039 .146 .143 -.074 1
RHK .345 .149 -.137 .124 .030 -.035 1
RUS .015 .008 -.142 -.001. .049 .060 .215 1
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4. Test for Multiple Granger-causality of Interest Rates
A.  Japanese LIBOR
_____________________________________________________________________________________
RJAP RKOR RMAL RSNG RTHL RIND RPP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RJAP .000 .001** .864 .002** .283 .382 .003**
RKOR .021* .000 .966 .034* .082 .000** .121
RMAL .912 .661 .000 .174 .262 .000** .295
RSNG .760 .031* .018* .000 .272 .000** .832
RTHL .904 .223 .320 .339 .000 .078 .951
RIND .687 .811 .000** .614 .022* .000 .852
RPP .414 .256 .137 .005** .522 .192 .000
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint exclusion of all lags of
    explanatory variable j in the regression of variable i.
2) lag length of 4 is chosen by likelihood-ratio test. Prob [Lag (6 vs 4): Chisquared (98) = 63.4] = 0.997,
    Prob [ Lag ( 4 vs 3) : Chisquared (49) = 82.4] = 0.0019.
B. U.S. CP Rate
_______________________________________________________________________________________
RUS RKOR RMAL RSNG RTHL RIND RPP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUS .000 .001** .864 .002** .283 .382 .003**
RKOR .256 .000 .719 .342 .278 .000** .568
RMAL .812 .658 .000 .220 .239 .000** .251
RSNG .837 .064 .024* .000 .263 .000** .927
RTHL .046* .223 .046* .905 .000 .020* .887
RIND .204 .467 .000** .688 .010* .000 .867
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RPP .936 .482 .096 .001** .400 .235 .000
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint exclusion of all lags of explanatory
    variable j in the regression of variable i.
2) lag length of 4 is chosen by likelihood-ratio test. P[Lag (8 vs 4): Chisquared(196) = 197.9] = 0.45,
     Prob[ Lag (4 vs 3) :Chisquared (49) = 86.6] = 0.007.
Table 5.  Test of Unit Roots
___________________________________________________________________________
A. Level     Lag1)        ADFt         ADFz         B. Difference    Lag
1)    ADFt         ADFz
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Deviation from UIP
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DXK 3, 3 -2.26 -15.6* DDXK 3,2 -6.85** -352.4**
DXM 8, 3 -0.87 -1.15 DDXM 9,0 -12.21** -121.0**
DXS 3, 0 -0.73 -1.77 DDXS 5,1 -9.67** -193.9**
DXT 0, 0 -0.81 -2.23 DDXT 0,0 -11.04** -110.9**
DXI 17, 5  1.86 -1.06 DDXI 7,4    2.52 16.15*
DXP 4, 0 -0.21 -0.69 DDXP 0,0 -7.43** -72.12**
DXH 3, 0 -1.52 -3.41 DDXH 3,0 -7.57** -55.92**
Exchange rates against Japnese yen
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
XKOR 8, 3 -0.52 -1.58 DXKOR 7,2 -7.75** -613.5**
XMAL 0, 0 -1.76 -6.36 DXMAL 5,0 -10.52** -106.71**
XPP 4, 0  0.08  0.25 DXPP 0,0 -8.37** -89.97**
XSNG 0, 0 -1.42 -4.62 DXSNG 0,0 -9.12** -91.74**
XTHL 4, 1 -2.30 -10.9 DXTHL 1,1 -7.79** -128.31**
XHK 7, 0 -3.16* -14.1** DXHK 0,0 -7.73** -76.92**
XIND 17,17  1.38  1.52 DXIND 5,4 2.582 10.67
Market Interest Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RLBJAP 0, 0 -0.74 -0.52 DRLBJAP 0,0 -7.01** -67.01**
RIND 4, 0 -1.49 -9.85 DRIND 3,1 -8.98** -180.2**
RKOR 2, 0 -1.76 -9.49 DRKOR 1,1 -7.89** -126.7**
RMAL 12, 7 -0.63 -10.2 DRMAL 11,6 -1.24 -8.38
RTPP 1, 1 -2.03 -8.12 DRTPP 8,0 -7.91** -76.61**
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RTHL 1, 0 -2.42 -13.6 DRTHL 0,0 -12.29** -120.35**
RHK 0, 0 -3.00* -15.3* DRHK 0,0 -9.41** -66.27**
RSNG 2, 2 -1.74 -6.67 DRSNG 5,1 -9.48** -189.2**
________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Smaller lags (SIB) are used for the estimation
Tabel 6.   Identification of the Model for 7 Asian countries
________________________________________________________________________
Country Estimation
Period
ARIMA 1) AIC,
SBC
prob[Q] Standard
Error of
Estimation
Adj.
R2
GARCH
Error
Test 2)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Hong Kong 1994:07 -
1998:05
 (1,1,1) -17.76,
-14.06
0.429 .118 0.861 P[c(1)]
=.048
Indonesia 1990:01 -
1998:03
 (3,1,3) 670.9,
686.4
0.986 3.131 .807 P[c(2)]=.
000
Korea 1990:01 -
1998:04
 (3,0,3) 302.9,
318.5
0.969 0.450 0.804 P[c(3)]=.
045
Malaysia 1990:01 -
1998:04
 (2,0,2) -16.5,
 -6.2
0.345 0.090 0.986 P[c(2)]=.
004
Philippines 1990:01 -
1998:04
 (2,1,1)  14.6,
 22.4
0.548 0.170 0.964 P[c(2)]=.
043
Singapore 1990:01 -
1998:04
 (1,2,1)  73.3,
 84.6
0.051 0.145 0.941 P[c(2)]=.
000
Thailand 1990:01 -
1998:04
 (3,1,3) 160.3,
175.9
0.803 0.219 0.937 P[c(2)]=.
039
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Model is identified using SBC and AIC.
2) Lagrangian Multiflier Test of Existence of GARCH errors.
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Table 7.  Estimation of ARIMA Model for 7 Asian Countries
Dependent Variable: Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity
____________________________________________________________________________________
a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 Adj R
2 D.W. p[Q] SEE
_______________________________________________________________________
Hong Kong .868** -1.23** .861 2.17 .429 .118
(.036) (.125)
Indonesia .952** 2.67** .680** 1.29** -0.66** -.97** .801 1.43 .993 1.432
(.235) (.370) (.246) (.084) (.153) (.105)
Korea .95** .81** -.75** -.13 -.69** -.51** .804 2.02 .969 .451
(.002) (.000) (.000) (.109) (.101) (.124)
Malaysia 1.68** -.68** -.92** .28** .987 1.97 .345 .090
(.200) (.202) (.218) (.102)
Philippines 1.14** -.32** -.83** .968 2.04 .356 .105
(.204) (.097) (.196)
Singapore .205** .049** .942 2.45 .051 .146
(.048) (.051)
Thailand 1.33** -1.41** .59 -1.60** 1.74** -.84* .938 1.91 .803 .219
(.349) (.254) (.344) (.301) (.256) (.333)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Single Asterisk denotes significance of the estimated coefficient at 5 percent critical level and
double asterisks at 1 percent critical level.
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Table 8. Granger-causality Test of Capital Mobility
_________________________________________________________________
                                       Explanatory lagged variables
_____________________________________________________________________________________
DXK DXM DXS DXT DXI DXP DXH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DXK .000 .046* .610 .366 .050* .011* .510
DXM .565 .000 .211 .382 .329 .496 .144
DXS .782 .166 .000 ..725 .175 .110 .039*
DXT .133 .555 .188 .000 .314 .572 .637
DXI .000 .032* .004* .298 .000 .283 .602
DXP .488 .131 .016* .415 .457 .000 .537
DXH .004* .050* .001* .127 .023* .019* .000
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint
exclusion of all lags of explanatory variable j in the regression of variable i.
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Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of GARCH  Model
________________________________________________________________________
Country       f t-1    f t-2      f t-3       e t-1     e t-2    e t-3                   h t                       Function Value
________________________________________________________________________
THAILAND         1.018**    -.918**     .885**        .083         .864**       .065        .001 + .42**e 2t-2   + .63**ht-1             246. 58
                             (.054)        (.090)       (.084)          (.099)      (.009)        (.089)     (.001)  (.143)           (.096)
MALAYSIA        1.718**    -.721**            -          -.912 **    .269**         -            .006 **+ .19e 2t-2   +  .90**ht-1          195.01
                                         (.132)        ( .131)                            (.221)        (.154)                          (.001)       (.128)          (.00)
KOREA                1.054**      556**     -.610**       -.024       - .028**     - .24**     .089** +1 .44**e 2t-2   + .5**ht-1            63.31
                                         (.052)          (.052)         (.053)          (.053)       (.052)          (.052)      (.007)       (.052)              (.052)
PHILIPPINES      0.245**      .771**        -              1.018**       -                  -          .004  + .36*e 2t-2   + .26**ht-1                  181.2
                                         (.075)          (.066)                             (.022)                                            (.002)   (.177)         (.270)
INDONESIA       .453**    -.076*     .639**             .275**      .400**     -.581**    1.93 + .31 *e 2t-2   +.42**ht-1            -166.5
                            (.035)      (.034)      (.027)             (.000)        (.003)      (.003)      (22.79) (.065)           (.126)
SINGAPORE      .429**           -      -                       - 0.34**          -                -        .007 +.92**e 2t-2   + .37**ht-1                90.94
                               (.048)                                                 (.01)                                            (.373)  (.03)               (.021)
HONG KONG    .904**           -       -                       -.15.065        -           -               .014** + .13e 2t-2                                             73.88
                            (.046)                                              (.151)                                       (.003)      (.158)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
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1) GARCH(p,q) is selected using AIC and SBC.
2) * denotes significance at 5% critical level and  double asterisks denote significance at 1% critical level.
3) BFGS algorihm is used.
4) Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 10. Granger-causality Test of Capital Market Risk
__________________________________________________________
                                       Explanatory lagged variables
____________________________________________________________________________
KVAR MVAR SVAR TVAR IVAR PVAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KVAR .0 .049* .216 .002** .000** .307
MVAR .000** .0 .338 .294 .001** .021*
SVAR .665 .041* .0 .567 .067 .419
TVAR .276 .523 .126 .0 .814 .053
IVAR .000** .338 .007** .003** .0 .285
PVAR .037* .489 .109 .829 .192 .0
____________________________________________________________________________
Note
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint exclusion of all lags of
explanatory variable j in the regression of variable i.
2) KVAR is the Korea’s Time-Varying Conditional Variances
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Table 11. Multiple  Granger-causality Test  of Exchange Rates
A: Test with  Japanese yen
__________________________________________________________________
                                       Explanatory lagged variables
__________________________________________________________________
XKOR XMAL XSNG XTHL XIND XPP XHK
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
XKOR .000 .036* .947 .000** .656 .031* .000**
XMAL .016* .000 .207 .154 .005** .006** .002**
XSNG .004** .022* .000 .597 .085 .023* .112
XTHL .001** .012* .127 .000 .363 .004** .005**
XIND .006** .139 .097 .000** .000 .074 .000**
XPP .083 .002** .014* .264 .177 .000 .000**
XHK .012* .016* .418 .528 .183 .006** .000
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint exclusion of all lags of explanatory
variable j in the regression of variable i.
B. Test with US dollar
_________________________________________________________________
                                       Explanatory lagged variables
______________________________________________________________________________________
XKOR XMAL XSNG XTHL XIND XPP XHK
XKOR .000 .879 .610 .000** .000** .516 .129
XMAL .008** .000 .340 .000** .054 .012* .314
XSNG .035* .000** .000 .000** .002** .000** .013*
XTHL .004** .387 .202 .000 .001** .740 .383
XIND .001** .158 .439 .000** .000 .526 .859
XPP .717 .104 .393 .034* .158 .000 .655
XHK .258 .171 .006** .229 .038* .191 .000
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_______________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
1) Each entry (i,j) denotes the marginal significance level of the F test on the joint exclusion of all lags of explanatory
variable j in the regression of variable i.
                    Figure 1. Dynamic Capital Mobility of Seven Asian Countries
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Capital Mobility of Indonesia
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Capital Mobility of Korea
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                    Figure 1. Dynamic Capital Mobility (Continued)
                     
Capital Mobility of Malaysia
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Capital Mobility of Philippines
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Capital Mobility of Singapore
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                   Figure 1. Dynamic Capital Mobility (continued)
                 
Capital Mobility of Thailand
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                    Figure 2. Capital Market Risk of Seven Asian Countries
                  
Capital Market Risk of Hong Kong
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Capital Market Risk of Indonesia
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Capital market Risk of Korea
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                  Figure 2. Capital Market Risk (continued )
                   
Capital Market Risk of Malaysia
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Capital Market Risk of Philippines
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Capital Market Risk of Singapore
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                                Figure 2. Capital Market Risk (continued)
                    
Capital  Market Risk of Thai land
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                   Figure 3. Exchange Rate Misalignments against Japanese yen
                 
Misalignment: Hong Kong 
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Misalignment: Indonesia
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Misalignment: Korea
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                   Figure 3. Exchange Rate Misalignments (continued)
                
Misalignment: Malaysia
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Misalignment: Philippines
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Misalignment: Singapore
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                       Figure 3. Exchange Rate Misalignments (continued)
48
                  
Misalignment: Thailand
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                             Figure 4. Interest Rate Differentials with Japan and U.S.
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Hong Kong: Japan and U.S.
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Indonesia: Japan and U.S.
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Korea: Japan and U.S.
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                                     Figure 4. Interest Rate Differentials (continued)
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Malaysia: Japan and U.S.
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Philippines: Japan and U.S.
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Singapore: Japan and U.S.
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                         Figure 4. Interest Rate Differentials (continued)
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Thailand: Japan and U.S.
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